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JURISDICTION--TERRITORIAL WATERS--ARCTIC WATERS
POLLUTION PREVENTION ACT EXTENDS LIMITED CANADIAN
JURISDICTION OVER NORTHWEST PASSAGE

I.

Introduction

On June 17, 1970, Canada passed the Arctic Waters
Pollution Prevention Act which asserts jurisdiction over
Arctic waters 100 miles off her coasts for the purpose of
pollution prevention regulation. 1 The Act proscribes any
discharge of waste into Arctic waters,2 and prohibits
navigation in certain "shipping safety control zones"
in Arctic waters unless regulations pertaining to structural,
equipment, navigational aid, cargo, and personnel qualiGiven the conflict between
fication standards are met.
the traditional freedom of the seas and the seriousness of
the ocean pollution problem, the Canadian action is likely
to provoke much controversy.

1. Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, 18-19 Eliz.
2, c. 47 (Can. 1970), reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
543 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Pollution Prevention Act].
2. Pollution Prevention Act § 4(1). Waste is broadly
defined in § 2(h) as any substance which would alter detrimentally the water quality. In the Act, "Arctic waters"
refers to the waters within the area enclosed by the 60th
parallel of North Latitude, the 141st meridian of West
Longitude, and a line measured seaward from the Canadian
coasts therein for a distance of 100 nautical miles. The
60th parallel coincides with the border between the Northwest
Territories and the western Provinces. The 141st meridian
coincides with the Canadian and northern Alaska border.
Section 18(1) provides that any person violating § 4(1) is
subject to a fine not exceeding $5,000, and any ship in
violation is subject to a fine not exceeding $100,000.
Section 18(2) makes each day of violation a separate offense.
3. Pollution Prevention Act § 12. Pursuant to § 11(i),
in Council may designate areas of the Arctic
Governor
The
waters as "shipping safety control zones" as he deems necessary.
Section 12 of the Act also permits the Governor in Council to
promulgate regulations. The maximum fine specified in § 19
for failure to comply with the regulations is $25,000.

In March, 1967, the wreck of the Torrey Canyon off
the coast of Cornwall, England, dumped 80,000 tons of
crude oil into international waters and alerted the world
to the ecological dangers posed by oil tankers. This
disaster, in combination with the first successful commercial
voyage through the Northwest Passage late in the summer of
1969, 5 and the discovery of the vast oil fields at Prudhoe
Bay in Alaska, perhaps was responsible for the Canadian
legislation. Also responsible were the frequent continental
shelf oil drilling disasters, of which the 1968 7 Santa
Barbara Channel oil spill is the most infamous.
Off-shore drilling is covered in the Act by a provision
which requires the submission of work plans, specifications,
and evidence of financial responsibility.8 In addition to
the accidental pollution of wrecks and spills, deliberate
discharges causing pollution, such as bilge pumping, ballast
dumping, and tank cleaning operations fall within the Act's
proscriptions. Authorities have indicated that the necessity

4. See Nanda, The "Torrey Canyon" Disaster: Some Legal
Aspects, 44 DENVER L.J. 400 (1967).
5. This voyage was made by the United States icebreaking tanker S.S. Manhatten. N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1969,
at 1, col. 3. For a discussion of the Canadian response to
the Manhatten's voyage and the Arctic sovereignty question
in general see, Note, The Manhatten's Arctic Conquest and
Canada's Response in Legal Diplomacy, 3 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
189 (1970).
6. See generally Carter, North Slope: Oil Rush, 166
SCI. 1220 (1969).
7. See Baldwin, The Santa Barbara Oil Spill, 42 COLO.
L. REV. 33 (1970). See generally Note, Continental Shelf
Oil Disasters: Challenge to International Pollution Control,
55 CORNELL L. REV. 113 (1969).
8. Pollution Prevention Act §§ 8, 10 (financial
responsibility may be in the form of insurance or indemnity
bonds).
9. Kufe, Water and Air Pollution and the Public Health,
INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS 31 (1970); Nanda, supra note 4, at

402.

for these discharges can be eliminated by better ship design
and equipment.10
Canada took unilateral action on the ocean pollution
problem because she felt international measures were either
non-existent or ineffective. The 1958 Geneva Convention on
"Every state shall draw up regulations
the High Seas provides:
to prevent pollution of the seas by the discharge of oil from
ships or pipelines or resulting from the exploration of the
seabed and its subsoil, taking account of existing treaty
provisions on the subject."1 1 While this language might
appear sufficient, the regulations must be consistent with
the principles of the law of the sea set forth in other
Geneva conventions. 1 2 Existing treaty provisions on the
subject include the 1954 International Convention for the
Prevention of the Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1 3 as amended
in 196214 and 1969.15 The 1954 and 1962 provisions established
zones of 50 and 100 miles, respectively, within which oil
could not be discharged from certain sized vessels. The
1969 amendments prohibit oil discharges anywhere on the
oceans. 1 6 The Canadian Act goes further and allows regulation
10. Kufe, supra note 9, at 31; Nanda, supra note 4, at
420-21.
11. The Geneva Convention on the High Seas, opened for
signature April 29, 1958, [1962] 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S.
No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter cited as High Seas
Convention].

12. These are examined in Part II infra.
13. Opened for signature May 12, 1954, [1961] 12 U.S.T.
2989, T.I.A.S. No. 4900, 327 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter cited as
Oil Pollution Convention].
14. Opened for signature April 11, 1962, [1966] 17 U.S.T.
1523, T.I.A.S. No. 6109, 600 U.N.T.S. 332.
15. The 1969 amendments are annexed to I.M.C.O. Doc.
A VI/Res. 175 of Jan. 16, 1970, 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1
(1970).
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON OIL POLLUTION OF THE
16.
SEA, REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS HELD IN ROME, OCTOBER 1968, at 295

(1969). The convention has proved largely ineffective because
the polluting ship itself is solely responsible for reporting
violations.

and, if necessary, prevention of passage to stop oil, or
any other waste, from being deposited in the 100 mile zone.
Also in 1969, two other conventions were opened for
signature: the International Convention on Civil Liability
for Oil Pollution Damage 1 7 and the International Convention
Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil
Pollution Casualties. 1 8 The former establishes the general
rule that ship owners will be held strictly liable for any
oil pollution damage. This liability is assessed on the
basis of the tonnage of the ship involved.1 9 The latter
Convention allows coastal states to take "necessary" measures
to limit or prevent damage to their shores following oil
pollution casualties. Thus both of these Conventions are
remedial in nature, while the Canadian Act contains strong
preventive measures.
Additional reasoning for the passage of the instant
Act is found in the very nature of the Arctic waters. The
Arctic Ocean, in its predominantly frozen state, obviously
differs from the other oceans. Pollution is a particularly
serious problem in cold climates since the accumulation of
oil on the shores persists much longer than in temperate
regions. Pack ice covers about ninety per cent of the
Artic Ocean with an average thickness of three meters.2 0
But the pack is not immobile; therelis constant motion both
locally and over the entire Arctic.
These factors indicate
the uniqueness of the Arctic which appears to be in consonance
with the uniqueness of the Canadian Act itself.

17. Opened for signature Nov. 29, 1969, 9 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 45 (1970).
18. Opened for signature Nov. 29, 1969, 9 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 25 (1970).
19. Liability is limited to approximately $134 per ton
of the ship's gross tonnage for each incident, but the total
liability for each incident must not exceed $14,000,000.
Additionally, all ships carrying more than 2000 tons of oil
must have oil pollution insurance.
20. Pharand, Freedom of Seas in the Arctic Ocean, 19
U. TORONTO L. J. 210 (1969).
21. Id. at 219.

II.

The Law of the Sea

Ocean waters may be divided into four categories:
internal waters, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone,
and the high seas. All ocean waters from the 2 low tide
mark landward are considered internal waters.
As a
general rule, ports, bays, coastal indentations, and "areas
near coasts off which islands and rocks are found in close
proximity" are internal waters. 23 A baseline connecting
the low tide marks of the natural entrance to the bays and
coastal
indentations form the outer boundary of the waters
theein24
therein. 2
A nation has the same absolute sovereignty over
waters as it does over its land areas. 2
internal
its
The territorial sea extends from the internal waters
baseline seaward for a distance of from three miles to two
hundred miles, depending upon the individual country's
prediliction. 2 6 - International law historically has

22. Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone, arts. 3, 5(l), opened for signature April 29,
1958, [1964] 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S.
205 [hereinafter cited as Territorial Sea Convention].
23. M. MC DOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE
OCEANS 89 (1962).
24. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 7(3).
The baseline
cannot exceed 24 miles in length, except for certain "historic"
bays and certain coastal island configurations. Territorial
Sea Convention, arts. 7(4), 7(6).
25. M. MC DOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 23, at 29. But
McDougal and Burke feel that even in internal waters "contemporary interdependences in the enjoyment of the oceans are so
intense" that coastal state sovereignty should not be
absolute, but that there occasionally should be an "appropriate
balancing" with the interests of the flag state. M. MC DOUGAL
& W. BURKE, supra note 23, at 99.
26. The United States claims a three mile territorial
sea. Canada recently extended her claim from three miles
to twelve miles by An Act to Amend the Territorial Sea and
Fishing Zones Act, 18-19 Eliz. 2, c. 68 (Can. 1970).
For a
list of the territorial sea claims of the various nations
see, Alexander, Offshore Claims of the World, in THE LAW OF
THE SEA 72-75 (L. Alexander ed. 1967).

recognized the three mile territorial sea. 2 7 The two
hundred mile claims of a few Latin American countries
have failed to win any international acceptance. 2 8 Limits
of from four to twelve miles have recently been respected,
29
but as yet have received no formal international recogniza on.
The coastal state has sovereignty over its territorial sea,
subject to the right of innocent passage given to ships of
other states. 31 The Geneva Convention on the Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone states that "passage is innocent
so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or
security of the coastal state." 3 2 Although this 1958
convention was the first formal declaration of the right
a custom has long been established
of innocent passage, such
33
in international law.
27. See Kent, The Historical Origins of the Three Mile
Limit, 48 AM.J. INT'L L. 537 (1954).
28. M. MC DOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 23, at 500.
Professor McDougal criticizes the broad Latin American
claims on a policy basis by declaring that they do not
represent genuine exclusive interests because they are made
with no promise of reciprocity. If other states made the
same claims the Latin American countries would show no net
gain. McDougal, International Law and the Law of the Sea,
in THE LAW OF THE SEA 8-9 (L. Alexander ed. 1967).
29. See M. MC DOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 23, at
69-74.
30. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 1(i).
31. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(1).
32. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(4).
33. Pharand, Innocent Passage in the Arctic, 6 CAN. YB.
INT'L L. 3, 4 (1968). There is a difference of opinion as to
where the burden of proof is to be placed regarding the
innocence of the passage. Professor McDougal holds that the
ship has the burden of proving her innocence. McDougal,
supra note 28, at 17. Others are of the opinion that the
passage is presumed innocent until the coastal state shows
otherwise. E.g., Gross, The Geneva Converence on the Law of
the Seas and the Right of Innocent Passage Through the Gulf
of Aqaba, 53 AM.J. INT'L L. 564, 582 (1959).

The contiguous zone is an area over which the coastal
state may not exercise sovereignty.
But, according to the
Territorial Sea Convention, it is an area over which the
state may exercise the control necessary to "(a) prevent
infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary
regulations within its territory or territorial sea; (b) punish
infringement of the above regulations commited within its
territory or territorial sea° 1,34 The Convention also provides
that "[t]he contiguous zone may not extend beyond twelve
miles from the baseline from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured." 3 5 The Canadian Act appears
to be grounded in such a contiguous zone theory.
The remainder of the ocean waters is classified as the
high seas, upon which all states have complete equality of
access, use, and enjoyment. 3 6
Ocean space is res communis,

34.
Territorial Sea Convention, art. 24(1).
35.
Territorial Sea Convention, art. 24(2).
36. McDougal, supra note 28, at 19.
This statement
requires some qualification since the Geneva Convention on
Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High
Seas, opened for signature April 29, 1958 [1966] 17 U.S.T.
138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285, gave the coastal
state the right to demand that states fishing off its
coasts agree to conservation measures in accord with the
conservation measures of the coastal state. The Geneva
Convention on the Continental Shelf, opened for signature
April 29, 1958, [1964] 1 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578,
499 U.N.T.S. 311, gave the coastal state sovereign rights
over the continental shelf for the purpose of exploiting its
natural resources. The continental shelf is defined loosely
in Article 1 as referring "(a) to the seabed and subsoil of
the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area
of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond
that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters
admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the
said areas; (b) to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine
areas adjacent to the coasts of islands. Article 2 of the
High Seas Convention, supra note 11, codifies the principle
of freedom of the high seas. Article 1 of the Convention

the property of all, as opposed to res nullis, the property
of none, and subject to appropratbn.77 The rationale for
freedom of the seas is found in the very nature of the sea
itself which makes it incapable of possession and the
necessity of keeping the sea lanes open to facilitate
commerce.

III.

The Canadian Pollution Prevention Act
and the Law of the Sea

The legal status of the Arctic Ocean has long been in
dispute. Even Canadian governmental officials have differed
in their views of the Arctic. Charles Stewart, Minister of the
Interior (1925), L. B. Pearson, then Ambassador to the
United States (1946), and Prime Minister St. Laurent (19531
38
state that Canadian territory extended to the North Pole.
These claims were based on a theory of the Arctic as a
res nullis and, hence, subject to acquistion by prescription.
Such prescription on behalf of Canada is evidenced by three
factors: first, British and Canadian exploration; second,
Canadian assertion of jurisdiction over criminal offenses;
and third, Canadian licensing of whalers and collection of
customs duties. 3 9 Alternatively, Jean Lesage, Minister of
the Department of Northern Affairs, said in 1956 that Canada's

defines the "high seas" as "all parts of the sea that are
not included in the territorial waters or in the internal
waters of a state." Thus freedom of the seas prevails in
the contiguous zone, subject to the restrictions of that
zone. See generally H. GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS
(Magoffin trans. 1916).
37.

Bryne, Canada and the Legal Status of Ocean Space

in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, 28 FAC. L. REV. 1, 2
(1970).
Pharand, supra note 33, at 52-53.
38.
39. Bryne, supra note 37, at 2-3. For a discussion of the
now discredited "sector theory" as an alternative to prescription

see, Head, Canadian Claims to Territorial Sovereignty in the
Arctic, 9 MC GILL L. J. 200, 202-210 (1963). Under the
"sector theory" no acts of prescription were needed as a
nation claimed sovereignty over a bordering res nullis
simply because said nation was the nearest in point of
space to the res nullis.

sovereignty did not extend over the Arctic Ocean. 4 0 Many
scholars have supported Lesage's position, contending that
41
freedom of the seas applies in the Arctic Ocean.
There has been some support for classifying the waters
42
of the Canadian archipelago as Canadian internal waters.
This argument is contingent on drawing a network of baselines
around the islands in the archipelago and enclosin2 the waters
inside the archipelago by the baseline extensions.
Proponents
of this theory cite the opinion of the International Court
of Justice in the Norwegian Fisheries Case. 4 4 In that case,
the Court held that the baseline for determining Norway's
territorial sea should not be drawn along the low tide mark
as usual, but it should be drawn along the outermost islands.
All waters between these islands and the mainland would thereby
be internal waters. One of the factors in the Court's decision
was the "close relationship existing between certain sea
areas and the land formations which divide or surround them."4 5
The Territorial Sea Convention dealt with this matter in
article 4(1):
"In localities where the coastline is deeply
indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands along
the coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of straight 46
baselines joining appropriate points may be employed. . .".
At the convention, proposals supporting the drawing of baselines around island groups such as the Canadian archipelago
were submitted but withdrawn before being voted upon. 7 One

40. Pharand, supra note 33, at 53. Professor Pharand
believes that Lesage's statement is the "best official evidence
available" of Canada's position.
41. See, e.g., Head, supra note 39, at 223-24; Pharand,
supra note 33, at 3. For a complete list of authorities on
both sides of the Canadian Arctic sovereignty question see,
Bryne, supra note 37, at 4-5.
42. E.g., Head, supra note 39, at 218. Canadian
archipelago is a group of many islands north of the Canadian
mainland through which the Northwest Passage routes wind.
43.
Bryne, supra note 37, at 6-8.
44.- [195-1] I.C.J. 116.
45. Norwegian Fisheries Case, 11951] I.C.J. 116, 133.
46. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 4(1).
47. Bryne, supra note 37, at 8.

commentator feels that baselines surrounding the Canadian
archipelago do not necessarily violate the provisions of the
Territorial Sea Convention or the principlesof the Norwegian
Fisheries Case. 4 8 Professor Pharand disagrees; the length
of the baselines necessary to surround the archipelago and
close off the Northwest Passage would make such a delimitation
"contrary to international law. "4 9 Professor Bryne argues
that the Canadian archipelago does not fit within the "deeply
indented coastline" and "fringe of islands along the coast"
phrasing of article 4(1). 5 0 Professor Bilder indicates that
the extensiveness of the archipelago is inconsistent with the
plain meaning of article 4(1). 5 1 Additionally, Canada's
failure to draw baselines around the archipelago at the time
she established them around her east and west coasts would
make it anomalous for her now to do so.52
Whether based on the res nullis argument or the archipelagic
argument, Canada may have rendered the sovereignty dispute
moot with the passage of the Pollution Prevention Act. In
the Act, Canada claims limited jurisdiction--inspection and
regulation to prevent pollution--only for 100 miles, not to
the North Pole. Consequently, she has implicitly abandoned
any claims in excess of those asserted in the Act.5 3 Canadian
officials, as might be expected, take the position that the
assertion of certain sovereign powers today does not mean that
powers in excess of those specified in the Act might not be
asserted tomorrow. They cite the North Atlantic Fisheries
Case 5 4 in support of this position.5 5

48. See Head, supra note 39, at 219.
49. Pharand, supra note 33, at 58. Drawing baselines
around the Canadian archipelago would require one nearly
100 miles in length and another of at least 50 miles. The
longest baseline in the Norwegian Fisheries Case was only
44 miles.
50. Bryne, supra note 37, at 8.
51. Bilder, The Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution
Prevention Act: New Stresses on the Law of the Sea, 69 MICH.
L. REV. 1, at n. 77 (1970).
52. Bryne, supra note 37, at 8.
53. Bryne, supra note 37, at 15.
54. The North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case (United States v.
United Kingdom), 11 U.N.R.I.A.A. 167 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1910).
55. Bilder, supr note 41, at n. 21.

Even accepting the validity of the archipelagic argument
and considering the waters of the archipelago as Canadian
internal waters, these waters remain subject to the right
of innocent passage. Generally there is no right of innocent
passage in internal waters. However, Article 5(2) of the
Territorial Sea Convention provides that the right of
innocent passage does exist in internal waters which are
created by the straight baseline method of article 4(1).
56
Canada did not ratify the Territorial Sea Convention.
Nevertheless, several Canadian officials have admitted that
the Convention is evidence of general international law
57
because most of the major maritime powers are signatories.
Yet there is some question as to whether the Northwest Passage
is an international strait through which innocent passage
is guaranteed by Article 16(4) of the Territorial Sea
Convention. 5 8 Although there has been very little traffic
through the Northwest Passage, 5 9 the test, as set forth by 60
the International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel Case
is not the volume of traffic but rather the strait's "geographical situation as connecting the two parts of the high
seas and the fact of its being used for international
navigation.",6 1 Hence, there may be a right of innocent
passage through the Northwest Passage. Canada, however, has
attempted to circumvent the right of innocent passage
altogether by characterizing the passage of potential
62
polluters as "noninnocent" per se.
It is unknown how
63
be.
will
effective this approach
The Pollution Prevention Act covers waters beyond those
of the archipelago. Therefore, should Canada claim sovereignty

56. Pharand, supra note 33, at 58-59.
57. Pharand, supra note 33, at 58-59.
58. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 16(4) states,
"There shall be no suspension of the innocent passage of
foreign ships through straits which are used for international
navigation between one part of the high seas and another part
of the high seas or the territorial sea of a foreign state."
59. See Pharand, supra note 33, at 42-45.
60. Corfu Channel Case, 11949] I.C.J. 222. For a
discussion of the Northwest Passage and the international
strait problem see Bilder, supra note 51, at 21-22.
61. Corfu Channel Case, 11949] I.C.J. 222, 428.
62. Bilder, supra note 51, at 20-21.
63. See Bilder, supra note 51, at 21.

over the archipelagic waters through the baseline theory,
it would not be sufficient to satisfy all of the jurisdictional
assertions in the Act. Sovereignty over the archipelagic
waters, however, would suffice for regulation of most of the
potential shipping routes off Canadian territory, leaving
unregulated only a few hundred miles along the northwest
coast of the mainland beyond the Amundsen Gulf in the
Mackenzie Bay area. Canada's recent twelve mile territorial
sea claim off all of her coasts 6 4 would subject most of the
straits in the Northwest Passage to her control; the most
notable exception is the Lancaster Sound - Viscount Melville
Sound - M'Clure Strait route.

Nonetheless, Canada decided in favor of the Pollution
Prevention Act, apparently based upon a contiguous zone
theory. No claim of sovereignty, as is inherent in an
internal waters or territorial sea assertion, is made by
the Act. In fact, the Prime Minister has expressly disclaimed
any assertion of sovereignty.6 5 As noted previously, the
Territorial Sea Convention placed a twelve mile limit on
the contiguous zone.6 6 The 100 mile Canadian zone claimed
in the Act is, therefore, obviously in violation of the
Convention. The Convention however has been strongly
criticized. Professors McDougal and Burke point to the
past and present national practices, particularly British
and American, of claiming authority over the high seas in
excess of twelve miles for certain special purposes. 6 7 As
early as the eighteenth century, great Britain asserted
authority over foreign shipping as far as 300 miles out to
sea for the purpose of preventing smuggling, and no other
nation complained of this practice. 6 8 In 1876 the Custom
Consolidation Act was passed in England giving authority
to seize certain foreign vessels within an "undefined distance
of the coast."'6 9 In Church v. Hubbart 7 0 the United States

64. See note 26 supra.
65. 114 H.C. DEB. 5955 (April 16, 1970), cited in Bilder,
supra note 51, at n. 21.
66. Note 35 supra. The 12 miles includes the territorial
sea. Thus if a 12 mile territorial sea is claimed, there can
be no contiguous zone under the Territorial Sea Convention's
provisions.
67. M. MC DOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 23, at 585-97.
68. M. MC DOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 23, at 585-86.
69. M. MC DOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 23, at 586.
70. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187 (1804).

Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Marshall,
recognized as lawful the Portuguese seizure of American
vessels on the high seas in order to protect her commercial
interests in Brazil. 7 1 During the Prohibition era, legislation
was passed in the United States authorizing the President to
declare "customs enforcement areas" which extended fifty
72
miles out to sea to aid in the apprehension of "rum-runners."
The United States has long had "Air Defense Identification
Zones" extending far beyond twelve miles, within which planes
73
bound for the United States must file position reports.
Given this history of far-reaching contiguous zone assertions
and the need for flexibility in meeting future scientific and
technological developments, Professor McDougal denounces the
Convention's twelve mile limit. 7 4 The contiguous zone shoul
function as a "safety valve from the rigidities of the
territorial sea,,'7 5 and, therefore, should not rigidly
restrict itself.
In addition to limiting the extent of the contiguous
zone, the Convention limited the purposes for which it may
be employed: namely, to protect "custom, fiscal, immigration
or sanitary" interests. 7 6 Pollution control would be included
under sanitary interests. McDougal and Burke declare that
the listing above "is certainly no accurate summary of the
purposes for which states have in the past demanded, and been
accorded, an occasional exclusive conpetence in contiguous
waters." 7 7 The most notable ommissions are those interests
relating to security and wealth.7 8 The International Law

71. M. MC DOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 23, at 587.
72. M. MC DOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 23, at 588.
73. 14 C.F.R. § 99 (1970).
74. "It seems to me utterly incredible that anybody
could ever have voted for a twelve mile limit on contiguous
zones. We are not living with such a limit; we couldn't live
with it!" McDougal, supra note 28, at 20.
75. M. MC DOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 23, at 76.
76. Territorial Sea Convention art. 24(1).
77. M,MC DOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 23, at 607.
78. M. MC DOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 23, at 604-05.

Commission recommended that "the extreme vagueness of the
term 'security' would open the way for abuses." 7 9 Despite
the fact that interests relating to wealth were omitted by
both the Commission and the contiguous zone provisions of
the Territorial Sea Convention, other Geneva conventions
provide for exclusive exploitation of the continental
shelf 80 and for high seas fisheries conservation by the
littoral state. 8 1 Divorcing the contiguous zone from the
continental shelf and fisheries conservation interests has
been criticized as "rigid conceptualism" which "denies the
fluidity of the general concept and affords opportunity for
irrational attempts to foreclose future claims to newly
developed uses of the sea." 8 2 McDougal and Burke would
prefer a broad, flexible contiguous zone with the conflicting
exclusive interest of the coastal state and inclusive
interests of all states in the high seas being resolved by
a balancing process using the more common standard of
reasonableness. 8 3 The factors to be used in determining
what is reasonable include the impact upon inclusive use
of the area affected, the interest sought to be protected
in terms of importance for the coastal state, and the
possibili 8t y4 of alternative methods of securing the coastal
interest.
The reaction to the Canadian Pollution Prevention Act has
ranged from highly favorable to highly unfavorable. Professor
Bryne, speaking of both the Pollution Prevention Act and the
extension of Canada's territorial sea to twelve miles, said
that such action "represents a near optimal solution for
Canada, in that it will secure for Canada the greatest extent
85
of claims that it is likely to succeed in maintaining."

79. M. MC DOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 23, at 604.
The International Law Commission worked for 8 years prior
to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea preparing
recommendations for the Convention, most of which were adopted.
80. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 36,
arts. 1, 2(1).
81. Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas, supra note 36, art. 6(1).o
82. M. MC DOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 23, at 77.
83. M. MC DOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 23, at 583.
84. M. MC DOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 23, at 583.
85. Bryne, supra note 37, at 15.

Professor Bryne appears to put some emphasis on the unique
conditions of the Arctic in arriving at his opinion of the
legality of the Canadian measure. 8 6 In an article written
before the introduction of the Pollution Prevention Act, a
commentator agreed that "states should be permitted a wide
zone of protection around their coasts, within which they
would be able to take the necessary action to prevent
pollution

.

.

.
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Others have also suggested an expansion

88
of the contiguous zone in order to combat pollution.
On the other hand, Ambassador Pardo is strongly critical
of the Act:
"This attitude, which is ultimately selfdefeating and appears incomprehensible, is due in part to
international political rivalries and in part to the
reluctance of states to surrender any of their legal rights
under international law to achieve a common beneficial
purpose for all unless the imminence
of common disaster
89
makes such surrender imperative.

IV.

Conclusion

As expected, Canada removed the Pollution Prevention
Act from the jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice. 9 0 This is indicative of the importance Canada
attaches to her interests protected in the Act, as well
as being yet another example of the congenital weakness of
an international law born of sovereign states. Even if
the Act were adjudicable, the Court should not declare its
jurisdictional assertions illegal, but should recognize the
need for a flexible contiguous zone as expressed by McDougal
and Burke. More likely, however, the Court would rule
against the Act for two probable reasons: first, the Court
would rather not overturn the express twelve mile contiguous
zone limitation of the Territorial Sea Convention; and second,
it would fear a deluge of widening coastal state assertations
of authority for reasons, few of which would be as worthy
as those of the Canadian Act. It is submitted that the
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Dilemma, 31 LA. L. REV. 45, 52
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twelve mile limitation of the Territorial Sea Convention
should be ignored so that each coastal state's assertion
of authority may be judged on its own merits. In view of
the probable lack of success of the McDougal and Burke
contentions in the Court, Canada properly foreclosed an
opportunity for the Court to strike them down.
American oil companies, as well as professional internationalists such as Ambassador Pardo, are understandably
disturbed by the Act; a bilateral agreement between Canada
and the United States would be more agreeable to them.
Apparently no United States offer to date has been
sufficiently protective of Canadian interests. Those
Canadian interests seemingly relate solely to pollution
prevention since other theories are readily available for
sovereignty claims.
The Pollution Prevention Act does not seem to be
unreasonable in its demands, and rather than causing a
proliferation of national pollution prevention acts with
varying standards, it could well serve as a model act. As
always, until there are effictive international measures,
individual states must act alone.

